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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Nineteenth Century philosopher Jeremy Bentham designed a prison
system known as the Panopticon which was arranged in such a way that a
single guard could, at any given time, view the activities and whereabouts
of any particular prisoner.1 Bentham designed the prison in such a way
that the prisoners could never tell whether they were being watched.2
Twentieth Century French philosopher Michel Foucault further considered
use of the Panopticon as a means of societal control through fear in his
seminal book Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.3 Foucault
viewed the Panopticon as representative of society’s change in the
Eighteenth Century from a power structure which exercised control
through public spectacle (e.g., public hangings and torture) to one which

*Steven B. Toeniskoetter earned his J.D., cum laude, from the University of San
Francisco School of Law in 2006. He would like to thank Professor Susan Freiwald for
bringing this issue to his attention and providing comments and critiques on early drafts.
1
James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired
Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); Wikipedia, Panopticon Definition, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panopticon (last visited May 09, 2007). Panopticon literally
means the “all-seeing”, from the ancient Greek word πανόπτης.
2
Id.
3
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195-228 (Alan Sheridan, trans., Vintage
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
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exercised control through constant, unseen surveillance.4 Cellular tracking
data has the potential to function as a Panopticon – permitting a single
entity to monitor the location (and thereby the activities) of any particular
person without that person ever knowing. Cellular tracking technology
presents many potentially advantageous uses, not the least of which is the
ability to track down a user during an emergency situation. But like any
powerful and invasive technology, the potential for abuse is also great.
Government and private actors could use cellular tracking technology to
track the movements of political opponents, members of unpopular
groups, or every citizen in the country and ultimately control their
activities through the fear of constant surveillance. Current electronic
surveillance law permits this type of abuse because of the lack of proper
constraints on law enforcement’s acquisition of prospective cell site data.
[2] New communications technology has always posed classification and
regulation problems for courts and legislators; cellular technology is no
exception. When Congress originally enacted the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),5 cellular technology was in
its infancy and the ability to track users via their cellular telephones was
rudimentary at best. Congress could not have foreseen at the time that
cellular technology could eventually be used to track individuals with the
substantial accuracy now available.
[3] Since the passage of the ECPA, a confusing patchwork (or “mosaic”
according to one court6) of laws regulating cellular technology has
emerged. Courts have split on whether to permit government agents
access to real-time cellular tracking information (“prospective cell site
data”) pursuant to a “hybrid theory”7 application.
4

Several authors have sought to apply Foucault’s ideas on surveillance to online and
electronic surveillance. See, e.g., Mark Winokur, The Ambiguous Panopticon: Foucault
and the Codes of Cyberspace, CTHEORY.NET ONLINE JOURNAL, available at:
http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=371; Boyle supra note 1.
5
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
6
In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the
Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947, 958 (E.D. Wis.
2006) [hereinafter Wisconsin Decision].
7
The “hybrid theory” application refers to an application for prospective cell site data
based upon the combined authority of a pen register order with that of a Stored
Communications Act order. See infra Section IV.
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[4] This paper first discusses current cellular technology and related
regulation in Section II. Section III provides an overview of the statutes
that govern cellular tracking technology and the cases that applied these
statutes prior to 2005. Section IV discusses recent cases that address the
procedural standard applicable to government acquisition of prospective
cell site data. Section V contains my analysis of the statutory and
constitutional framework applicable to law enforcement acquisition of
prospective cell site data. Section VI argues that Congress should fix the
ambiguities in the law to provide certainty and security for cellular users
and to prevent potential abuse of cell site data.
II. CELLULAR TRACKING TECHNOLOGY
[5] In order to evaluate the standards governing the acquisition of
prospective and real-time cellular tracking data (hereinafter “prospective
cell site data”8), it is necessary to first examine what sort of location data
the government has used cell phone technology to obtain. Unfortunately
there is no definitive answer. The court decisions addressing the issue are
either unclear about what the government has actually been able to obtain
or they contradict each other. However, based upon the facts of several
court decisions, the Enhanced 911 legislation (E-911), and several other
materials, it appears that the government can obtain data that fairly
accurately identifies the location of cell phone users. An examination of
the FCC’s Wireless Enhanced 911 service reveals the capabilities of
current technology.
A. ENHANCED 911 RULES
[6] In 1996, the FCC began creating rules to ensure that cellular phone
users would be able to connect to 911 operators through their cellular
phones and that the 911 operators would be able to obtain the location of
the cellular phone directly from the cellular service provider. The E-911
regulations, which are to be promulgated over time, require cellular
service providers to provide certain minimum pieces of information to 911
8

The courts discussing this issue use both the term “prospective cell site data” and “realtime cell site data.” As one court has discussed, the terms are not interchangeable. See
Section IV(C), infra. I generally use the term “prospective cell site data” for this paper
since “real-time cell site data” is a sub-category of prospective cell site data.
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operators.9 In Phase I, which required implementation by April 1, 1998,
cellular service providers were required to provide 911 operators with the
location of the single “cell site or base station” which received the 911
call.10 The cellular service providers merely had to provide the location of
a single cellular tower, and emergency responders would know the cellular
phone was within a certain radius of that cellular tower. Factual
recitations in recent court decisions reveal that at least some cellular
providers also have the ability to provide the general direction and/or
angle the cellular phone is in relation to the cell site.11 For ease of
reference, I will refer to this type of location data as “single cell site data.”
[7] In Phase II, the FCC required cellular service providers to provide 911
operators with the location of a cellular phone by longitude and latitude.12
The E-911 regulations provide two ways of meeting this requirement:
network-based technologies and handset-based technologies. Providers
who decided on network-based technologies had to ensure accuracy of
within 100 meters for sixty seven percent of calls and within 300 meters
for 100 percent of calls by October 1, 2002.13 Providers who decided on
handset-based technologies had to ensure accuracy of within fifty meters
for sixty seven percent of calls and within 150 meters for ninety five
percent of calls by October 1, 2001.14
[8] The term “network-based technologies” refers to the use of
triangulation to determine the general location of a cellular phone.
Network-based technologies require that two or more cell towers receive a
signal or signals from a cellular telephone at or about the same time.15
9

47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2006).
47 C.F.R. § 20.18(d)(1).
11
See, e.g., In Re Application Of The United States of America For An Order For
Disclosure Of Telecommunications Records And Authorizing The Use Of A Pen
Register And Trap And Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Gorenstein,
M.J.) [hereinafter S.D.N.Y. I]; Wisconsin Decision, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
12
47 C.F.R. § 20.18(e).
13
47 C.F.R. § 20.18(f) & (h).
14
47 C.F.R. § 20.18(g) & (h).
15
Where only one cell tower has received a signal from a cellular telephone, the data
provided is essentially single cell site data (i.e. a certain radius around a single cell
tower). For a more in-depth discussion of the different types of triangulation and a
general discussion of E-911, see Darren Handler, Comment, An Island of Chaos
Surrounded by a Sea of Confusion: The E911 Wireless Device Location Initiative, 10 VA.
10
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Several recent court decisions reveal that in addition to the location of a
single cell site, such data may also reveal which general direction and/or
angle the cellular phone is in relation to the cell site.16 The accuracy of
triangulation techniques generally improves with each additional cell
phone tower that receives a signal at about the same time. Consequently,
triangulation technology is most effective in urban areas where cell tower
density is high and much less effective in rural areas where cell tower
density is low.17
[9] The term “handset-based technologies” at this time seems to refer
solely to GPS-based18 systems for determining the location of a cellular
telephone. A cellular provider using a GPS-based system uses a GPS
receiver built in to the cellular phone handset itself to obtain the handset’s
location, which is then transmitted to the 911 operator.19 Normal GPS
accuracy is approximately within four to twenty meters, but that accuracy
can be improved using several additional technologies to within ten
centimeters.20 In contrast to triangulation technology, GPS tends to be
more accurate in rural areas than in urban areas because the signal can be
distorted by large buildings.21
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005); Recent Development, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy
Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 307, 308-10 (2004) [hereinafter Who Knows Where You’ve Been]; Laurie Thomas
Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Call Location Information and Privacy
Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 381, 384-88 (2003). See also Wikipedia,
Radiolocation Definition, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiolocation (last visited May 9,
2007) (describing the types of triangulation each major cellular provider currently uses).
16
See note 10 supra and accompanying text..
17
One article has suggested there may be areas in which a single cell tower covers an
area of several hundred miles. Who Knows Where You’ve Been supra note 15, at 309.
18
GPS, which stands for Global Positioning System, is a U.S. Government-developed
satellite system for determining a receiver’s location anywhere on earth. See generally,
Wikipedia, GPS Definition, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS (last visited May. 9 2007)
[hereinafter Wikipedia GPS Definition].
19
See 911 Dispatch Monthly Magazine Online, GPS Location Technology Page,
http://www.911dispatch.com/911/gps.html (last visited May 9, 2007).
20
Wikipedia, GPS Definition, supra note 18.
21
Id. This effect is called an “urban canyon.” However, in major urban centers, this
effect is lessened by the use of stationary GPS reference points called Wide Area
Augmentation Systems. See Wikipedia, Wide Area Augmentation System Definition,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wide_Area_Augmentation_System (last visited May 9,
2007).
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B. TYPES OF CELL SITE DATA AND THEIR AVAILABILITY
[10] The E-911 legislation reveals that there are three types of cellular
tracking data that government agents can potentially obtain from cellular
providers.
[11] In order from the most accurate to least accurate they are:
(1) GPS data
(2) Triangulation data
(3) Single cell site data.22
[12] There are eight times at which each type of data could be available:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Whenever a cellular phone is turned on
At the beginning of an outbound call
At the beginning of an inbound call
During an inbound or outbound call
At the end of an outbound call
At the end of an inbound call
At the beginning of a 911 call
At any time during a 911 call.23

[13] It is unclear exactly when a cellular provider can itself obtain any of
these three types of data. For instance, the E-911 regulations merely
require the cellular providers to provide GPS data when a cell phone user
dials 911.24 It is unclear whether the provider may obtain and record GPS
data whenever the cell phone is on or only while that person is on the
phone with a 911 operator.25 In several recent court decisions, the
Assistant U.S. Attorney’s (AUSA’s) application seeks tracking data only

22

See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006); Lee supra note 15.
Id.
24
47 C.F.R. § 20.18(e).
25
Some cellular phones with GPS allow users the ability to turn off the GPS for all
purposes but 911 service. See, e.g., Sprint PCS Website, Sanyo 8200 User’s Guide at 65,
available at
http://www1.sprintpcs.com/media/Assets/Equipment/Handsets/pdf/sanyopm8200.pdf
(last visited May 9, 2007).
23
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at the beginning and end of calls26 while in several other court decisions,
the AUSA seeks tracking data during a call as well.27
III. THE LAW PRE-2005
A. INTRODUCTION
[14] An examination of the law prior to recent decisions reveals the
building blocks upon which the latest court decisions rest. Accordingly,
this section reviews the existing federal statutory scheme governing
wiretapping, pen registers, stored electronic data, and tracking devices, as
well as Fourth Amendment case law as it applies to tracking devices.
B. WIRETAP ACT AND ITS PROGENY
[15] In 1967, the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States (hereinafter
Katz) broke new ground by finding that law enforcement agents needed a
warrant before they could listen to a person’s telephone conversations.28
The Katz court held that “the Fourth Amendment protects people – and not
simply ‘areas….’”29 The Court, through a concurring opinion, adopted a
new test for when communications would be protected under the Fourth
Amendment: Whenever a defendant exhibited a subjective expectation of
privacy in the communications and when that expectation of privacy is

26

See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. Decision I, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Wisconsin
Decision, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947 (E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Application Of The United States
For An Order: (1) Authorizing The Installation & Use Of A Pen Register & Trap & Trace
Device; & (2) Authorizing Release Of Subscriber Info. &/Or Cell Site Info., 411
F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006) (Hornsby, M.J.) [hereinafter Louisiana Decision].
27
See, e.g., In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Authority, 396 F.Supp.2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005) [hereinafter Texas Decision]; In
re Application of the United States for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Information
&/or Cell Site Info. (E.D.N.Y. Decision I), 384 F.Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); on
reconsideration (E.D.N.Y. Decision II), 396 F.Supp. 2d 294, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). For
the purposes of this paper, I treat E.D.N.Y. Decisions I and II as the same decision.
28
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
29
Id. at 353.
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objectively reasonable.30 The Katz court acknowledged the “vital role that
the public telephone has come to play in private communication.”31
[16] Within one year of the Katz decision, and in direct response to that
decision, Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (commonly referred to as the “Wiretap Act”).32
The Wiretap Act generally forbade private parties from intercepting any
covered communications, except with consent of the parties, and required
law enforcement agents to follow strict procedural requirements in order
to intercept wire communications.33
[17] In response to another technological revolution, the proliferation of
electronic mail, voicemail, and cordless and cellular telephones, Congress
passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).34
Title I extended most of the protections of the Wiretap Act to electronic
communications, 35 Title II added a new section protecting stored
communications and transactional records (known as the “Stored
Communications Act” (SCA)), and Title III added a new section on pen
registers and trap and trace devices (“Pen Register Provisions”).36
1. STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
[18] The SCA regulates how government agencies
transactional records and communications which have
electronically (i.e., communications obtained in a
simultaneous with their transmission).37 What follows is a

30

may obtain
been stored
manner not
distillation of

Id. at 361. (Justice Harlan, concurring).
Id. at 352.
32
Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520) (2000)).
33
Id.
34
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
35
While ECPA Title I generally extended the Wiretap Act to cover electronic
communications, it explicitly exempts electronics communications from the statutory
suppression remedy available to unlawful interception of wire and oral communications.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(10)(a) & (c). An “aggrieved party” still has, however,
constitutional remedies, if any apply. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(c).
36
Id.
37
Id.
31
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this complicated statutory scheme.38 The most relevant section for the
present discussion, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (hereinafter “Section 2703”) splits
stored records into three categories: (1) communications stored less than
180 days; (2) communications stored more than 180 days; and (3)
transactional/subscriber information.39
Law enforcement agents can
obtain communications stored less than 180 days solely with warrant,40
whereas it can obtain stored communications more than 180 days old with
a warrant, or on a showing of “specific and articulable facts [that the
communications sought] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation,” or an administrative subpoena requiring notice to the
subscriber.41 Finally, and most importantly for the present discussion, law
enforcement agents may obtain transactional records with either a warrant
or a showing that there are “specific and articulable facts showing that [the
records sought] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”42
2. PEN REGISTER PROVISIONS
[19] The Pen Register Provisions regulate how and when law enforcement
may install pen registers and trap and trace devices.43 A pen register is a
device (now usually a piece of software) that “records or decodes dialing,
routing, addressing, or signaling information (DRAS) transmitted by an
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is

38

For a lengthy explanation of the intricacies of the SCA see Orin S. Kerr, Symposium, A
User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending
It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004) (classifying the SCA’s treatment of content/noncontent records differently than I have); see also Deidre K. Mulligan, Symposium,
Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557 (2004).
39
18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
40
Id. § 2703(a).
41
Id. §§ 2703(b) & (d).
42
Id .§§ 2703(c) & (d). Subscriber records, a very narrow class of records defined in the
statute, are obtainable through an administrative subpoena. Id.
43
18 U.S.C. § 3121-3127. Courts and commentators often use the term “pen register” to
refer to both pen registers and trap and trace devices, probably because the “device” is
usually the same piece of software. Thus all references to “pen register” hereafter refer to
the combination of a pen register and a trap and trace device, unless otherwise noted.
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transmitted.”44 A trap and trace device provides essentially the same data
as a pen register - except that it records incoming DRAS information.45
By definition, DRAS information excludes the contents of electronic or
wire communications.46
[20] A court receiving an application for a pen register from a law
enforcement officer or a U.S. Attorney must grant the application so long
as it is complete.47 The only substantive element of the application
requires that the applicant must certify that “the information likely to be
obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation.”48 Law enforcement officers have no obligation ever to
disclose the existence of a pen register,49 and even if they were to do so,
aggrieved parties have no statutory suppression remedy, as they have for
defective wiretap applications.50
3. TRACKING DEVICE STATUTE
[21] One final statutory provision worth mentioning because of later
courts’ reliance upon its language is 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (hereafter the
44

Id. § 3127(3). Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, pen registers were much more
limited in their scope. The prior version of the statute defined a pen register as “a device
which records or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed
or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached…” 18
U.S.C. § 3127(3) (1988) (amended 2001).
45
Id. § 3127(4).
46
Id. § 3127(3).
47
Id. § 3123(a) See also Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes
After the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 972 note 113 (1996)
(examining the treatment of communications attributes in electronic surveillance law
before and after CALEA, the debate over the scope and treatment of “call setup”
information, and foreshadowing the present issue over law enforcement acquisition of
prospective cell site data).
48
115 Stat. 278, 288-89.
49
In fact, the Pen Register Provisions explicitly forbid service providers who receive pen
register orders from disclosing the existence of such an order to the target. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3123(d). In the author’s own experience, however, the existence and records of a pen
register are usually disclosed in discovery if the investigation results in a criminal
indictment since the government will often use the pen register evidence at trial.
50
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (2006). Under current Fourth Amendment case law, an
aggrieved party doesn’t have a constitutional suppression remedy either. See discussion
of Smith v. Maryland in Section III(B)(3), infra.
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“Tracking Device Statute”).51 The Tracking Device Statute empowers a
court, which is otherwise authorized to issue warrants, to issue a warrant
for the installation and use of a tracking device within its own jurisdiction,
as well as use of the device outside of its jurisdiction.52 The legislative
history of this statute shows that it was meant only to clarify jurisdictional
issues relating to the authorization of a tracking device and “does not
affect current legal standards for the issuance of such [a tracking device]
order.”53 As shown below in Section V(B)(4), caselaw and an amendment
to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have abrogated any particular
relevance this statute may have had.
C. FOURTH AMENDMENT
[22] As described above, the Supreme Court in Katz held that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people and not places.”54 A line of cases followed
that interpreted the Katz reasonableness standard in light of the
government’s use of sensory enhancement equipment, including “beepers”
and other tracking devices.55
[23] In United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court held that “a person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”56
Because the “beeper” revealed no more information than standard visual
surveillance, the search did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.57 The
following year in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court revisited the
practice of law enforcement use of beepers, but this time the beeper
entered into a private residence.58 The Karo court recognized the sanctity
51

18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2006).
Id.
53
S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 34 (1986).
54
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
55
For more on the use of “beepers” and other tracking devices, see generally Timothy
Joseph Duva, Comment, You Get What You Pay For…And So Does the Government:
How Law Enforcement Can Use Your Personal Property to Track Your Movements, 6
N.C.J.L & TECH. 165 (2004); Clifford S. Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the
Fourth Amendment: Knotts, Karo, and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U.L.
REV. 277 (1985).
56
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
57
Id. at 282.
58
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
52
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of a person’s residence and reiterated that “[s]earches and seizures inside a
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable….”59 The court
ultimately held that “[warrantless] monitoring of a beeper in a private
residence . . . violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a
justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.”60
[24] More recently, the Supreme Court refined its position on the use of
sensory enhancement in United States v. Kyllo.61 The law enforcement
agents in Kyllo had used a heat-sensing imager to get a “crude visual
image of the heat radiated from outside the house” which the agents then
used, with other information, to procure a search warrant for the house.62
The Court began its analysis by reiterating the sanctity of the home in
Fourth Amendment analysis: “‘[a]t the very core’ of the Fourth
Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”63 The five
member majority held that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area,’ . . . constitutes a search – at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use.”64 The Court
recognized that while the actual technology law enforcement agents used
in that case was not particularly accurate and did not reveal much
information about what was happening inside of the home, a warrant
would protect citizens from more intrusive technology “already in use or
in development.”65
[25] In 2003, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether the government’s
warrantless acquisition of cell site tracking data violated the Fourth
59

Id. at 714-15.
Id. at 714.
61
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
62
Id. at 30. For more on the technology used by law enforcement in this case and other
related technologies, see Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A
Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV.
507, 540-44 (2005).
63
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
64
Id. at 34 (citation omitted). Kyllo was a close case with an unusual five member
majority: Justice Scalia wrote the opinion and Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and
Breyer joined him.
65
Id. at 35-36.
60
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Amendment rights of the cellular phone owner.66 The law enforcement
agents in United States v. Forest had successfully petitioned for a Title III
Wiretap order to obtain communications from defendant Garner’s phone.67
The order also required the service provider to disclose “all subscriber
information, toll records and other information relevant to the
government’s investigation.”68
[26] While visually tracking the defendants driving in their car, the agents
lost sight of the defendants.69 An agent then called Garner’s cellular
phone several times, but did not let it ring, in order to obtain cell site data
from the cellular provider.70 The agents used the cell site data to regain
visual contact with the defendants and they arrested the defendants on
drug charges the following day.71
[27] The defendants in Forest challenged the acquisition and use of the
cell site data under both the Wiretap Act and the Fourth Amendment. It is
unclear on exactly what grounds under the Wiretap Act the defendants
attacked the use of the cell site data since they did not challenge the
validity of the court-approved wiretap order in place. Nonetheless, the
court held that the cell site data the agents acquired was not a
“communication” under the Wiretap Act, and even if it were a
communication, the defendants had no suppression remedy because the
“communication” was best characterized as an electronic
communication.72 In addressing the defendants’ claim that the cell site
data turned the cellular phone into a “tracking device” under the Tracking
Device Statute, the court held that the Tracking Device Statute provided
no statutory suppression remedy because it does not prohibit the use or

66

United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (2003), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 174 (2004),
reversed on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1100 (2005).
67
Id. at 947.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 948. The call to the defendant’s cell phone presumably generated a single cell
site data record.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 949. As stated in note 28, supra, the Wiretap Act excludes from the statutory
suppression remedy all “electronic communications.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(10)(a) &
(c) (2006).
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installation of a tracking device with or without a warrant or through
another statutory means.73
[28] Turning to the Fourth Amendment, the court found the facts
comparable to Knotts, and implicitly distinguishable from Karo, in that the
agents tracked the cell site data only while the defendant was traveling on
public highways.74 While the court recognized that Garner may have had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell-site data, the court
nonetheless rejected his claim because the agents had obtained no more
information than they could have by mere visual surveillance.75
[29] Finally, several courts have relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Smith v. Maryland, which held that acquisition of prospective cell site data
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.76 Several years prior to the
enactment of the ECPA, the Court examined the constitutionality of law
enforcement’s warrantless use of a pen register.77 The police installed a
pen register device on the defendant’s telephone, with the help of the
phone company78 to capture the numbers dialed. The Court first clarified
that the police had not intruded into a constitutionally-protected space or
invaded the defendant’s property, but rather that the facts were more
analogous to Katz. Following the Katz test, the Court held that the
defendant could not have had either a subjective or an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he dialed
because such numbers were voluntarily conveyed to a third party.
According to the Court, the defendant should have known that the phone
company could record the numbers.79

73

Forest, 355 F.3d at 950 (adopting the reasoning and holding of United States v.
Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 758 (D.C.Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000)).
74
Id. at 951-52.
75
Id. at 951.
76
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
77
Id. at 736.
78
The Court defined the pen register device as “a mechanical device that records the
numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial
on the telephone is released.” Id. at 736 n. 1 (quoting United States v. New York Tel.
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977)).
79
Id. at 745.
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IV. RECENT CASES ADDRESSING THE ACQUISITION OF CELL SITE DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
[30] Prior to August 25, 2005, no court in the United States had
established the standard the government must meet to obtain a court order
allowing prospective acquisition of cell site tracking data. Magistrate
Judge James Orenstein issued the first decision on the issue in E.D.N.Y.
Decision I,80 when he found that, while the government may obtain
historical cell site data based on the specific and articulable facts standard
of the Stored Communications Act, it may procure prospective cell site
data only after making a showing of probable cause.81 Shortly after this
decision, Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm. Smith issued an extensive
opinion, fully analyzing the issue and coming to the same conclusion as
Magistrate Orenstein.82 Magistrate Orenstein, on reconsideration, issued a
lengthier opinion several weeks later, relying in part on Magistrate
Smith’s intervening decision.83 Because Magistrate Smith’s analysis in
the Texas Decision forms the analytical basis for over a dozen subsequent
cases in a short period, I describe that decision before noting where other
cases have agreed, disagreed, or otherwise diverged.
B. THE TEXAS DECISION
[31] In the Texas Decision, the government applied for, among other
things, (1) a pen register order; and (2) an order for subscriber records
including
the location of cell site/sector (physical
address) at call origination (outbound
calling), call termination (for incoming
calls), and, if reasonably available, during
the progress of a call.” [] Also sought [was]
information regarding the strength, angle,
and timing of the caller’s signal measured at
80

E.D.N.Y. I, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
Id. at 564.
82
Texas Decision, 396 F.Supp.2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
83
E.D.N.Y. Decision II, 396 F.Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
81
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two or more cell sites, as well as other
system information such as a listing of all
cell towers in the market area, switching
technology,
protocols,
and
network
84
architecture.
[32] In setting the stage for its subsequent analysis, the court described the
statutory scheme and related procedural standards as follows:
•
•
•
•

wiretaps, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (super-warrant);
tracking devices, 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (Rule 41 probable cause);
stored communications and subscriber records, 18 U.S.C. §
2703(d) (specific and articulable facts);
pen register/trap and trace, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (certified
relevance).85

[33] The court began its analysis with the Tracking Device Statute, finding
that it “appears at first glance to provide the most likely fit for cell site
[data].”86 The court examined the statutory language and legislative
history of the Tracking Device Statute and found that Congress had
drafted the definition of “tracking device” broadly enough to cover the use
of cell site data to track individuals.87 The government had argued that
the use of prospective cell site data did not turn a cell phone into a
“tracking device” because (1) the legislative history of the Tracking
Device Statute showed the definition merely referred to “one-way radio
‘homing devices;’”88 and (2) prospective cell site data does not provide
detailed and precise location information.89
The court rejected this
argument and found that Congress, by using a broader definition of the
term “tracking device” under the Tracking Device Statute than that used in
the legislative history’s glossary definition, meant to afford the term a
broader meaning.90 According to the court, the precision or accuracy of
84

Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 749.
Id. at 753.
86
Id. at 753.
87
Id. at 754-55.
88
Id. at 753 (quoting S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3564).
89
Id. at 755.
90
Id. at 754.
85
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cell site data was immaterial because “§ 3117(b) does not distinguish
between general vicinity tracking and detailed location tracking.”91
Moreover, even if there were such a distinction in the statute, the court
found that present technology does, or at least has the potential to, provide
detailed and precise location information.92
[34] The court then addressed the Fourth Amendment issues implicated by
cell site data. The court distinguished Smith v. Maryland on the grounds
that, unlike dialed telephone numbers, “cell site data is not ‘voluntarily
conveyed’ by the user to the phone company [but rather is sent]
automatically . . . entirely independent of the user’s input, control, or
knowledge.”93
The court found support for the proposition that the
cellular phone owner retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
cell site data from a portion of the Wireless E-911 legislation.94 The
statute provides that a consumer “shall not be considered to have approved
the use or disclosure of or access to . . . [cellular] call location
information,” except in an emergency situation or with the consumer’s
prior consent.95 In dicta, the court acknowledged that some monitoring of
cell site data may be permissible under the Fourth Amendment (i.e. when
the user is traveling on public highways) but urged prosecutors
nonetheless to obtain Rule 41 warrants to avoid any potential Fourth
Amendment violations.96 Ultimately, the court held that “prospective cell
91

Id. at 755.
Id. at 755. The court further noted that the Department of Justice’s own manuals
describe the common usage of tracking devices which use cellular towers and GPS,
noting their precision. Id. at 755.
93
Id. at 756.
94
See id. at 757.
95
Id. at 757 (quoting from 47 U.S.C. § 222(f)). It would not be hard to imagine,
however, that cellular services contracts may currently or in the future provide that the
consumer expressly consents to disclosure of cell site data to third parties (e.g. for the
purposes of location-based advertising). Such a contract clause would seem to suggest
that a user has no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information, and thus no
Fourth Amendment protection. On cellular location based advertising already in use, see
Communicate Magazine, Big names deploy location-based marketing - location-based
marketing via cellular phone, September 2001, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BKU/is_2001_Sept/ai_79125278 (last
visited May 13, 2006). Cf. Freedman v. American Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 174,
182-183 (D.Conn. 2005).
96
Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
92
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site data is properly categorized as tracking device information under [the
Tracking Device Statute].”97
[35] The court next examined the Pen Register Provisions. The court
found that Congress, through the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA), had made its intent clear that pen registers, by
themselves, could not be used to acquire location information.98 The
pertinent section of CALEA provides that:
[W]ith regard to information acquired solely
pursuant to the authority for pen registers
and trap and trace devices (as defined in
section 3127 of Title 18), such callidentifying information shall not include any
information that may disclose the physical
location of the subscriber (except to the
extent that the location may be determined
from the telephone number).99
[36] The court dismissed the possibility that the “Super Warrant”100
protections of the Wiretap Act apply to cell site data because such data
does not constitute the contents of a communication.101 It similarly
rejected the first two sections of the SCA on the basis that they also
protected the contents of a communication.102 With regard to 18 U.S.C. §
2703(c), which regulates access to transactional records, the court found
that prospective cell site data did not fit the definition of “record[s]
pertaining to ‘wire or electronic communications’” because the definition
of “electronic communications” expressly excludes communications from
97

Id.
Id. at 757-58 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2) (2006)). For a discussion of the changes
made by CALEA to the existing statutory scheme see Freiwald, supra note 47.
99
47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006).
100
The term “Super Warrant” was coined by Orin S. Kerr. See Orin S. Kerr, Internet
Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT ACT: The Big Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U.
L. REV. 607, 645 (2003).
101
Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
102
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)&(b) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (2006))
(incorporating into the SCA the definition of “contents” from the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(8)).
98

18

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 4

a tracking device.103 The court also reasoned that the structure of the
ECPA shows that the SCA was meant to apply only to existing records
and not prospective records.104 The court came to this conclusion because,
unlike the Wiretap and Pen Register Statute sections of the ECPA which
provide precise time limits for use and renewal as well as for temporary
sealing of orders, the SCA lacks time limits and does not require sealing of
the order, presumably because revealing the existence of an SCA order
would not disrupt ongoing surveillance.105
[37] In support of its application, the government contended that the
authority of a pen register order, combined with the authority of an SCA
order, sufficed to authorize law enforcement to obtain prospective cell site
data. The government argued that cell site data is DRAS106 (specifically
“routing” data) under the Pen Register Provisions. It argued that, while
under the restriction added by CALEA the government cannot obtain cell
site data solely by using the Pen Register Provisions, it can nonetheless
obtain such data if it combines the authority of the Pen Register Provisions
with other authority.107 According to the government, this additional
authority can be found in the SCA.108 Essentially this “hybrid theory”
takes the prospective and DRAS features of the Pen Register Provisions
and combines them with the legal standard and transactional records
features of the SCA.
[38] The court rejected the government’s hybrid theory argument on
several grounds. First, it explained that the legislative history of the
PATRIOT Act109 clarified that DRAS was meant merely to allow pen
registers to obtain internet traffic data.110 Moreover, even if DRAS
included more than just internet traffic data, the court reasoned that DRAS
information must be “generated by, and incidental to, the transmission of

103

Id. at 758-59 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(C)).
Id. at 760 (emphasis added).
105
Id.
106
See note 41 supra and accompanying text..
107
Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761.
108
Id.
109
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2006).
110
Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761-62.
104
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‘a wire or electronic communication.’”111 Since a user generates cell site
data whether or not engaging in a wire or electronic communication, the
court found that it was not included in the definition of DRAS.112
[39] Again looking at legislative history, the court also found that
Congress did not intend Section 1002 to change electronic surveillance
law, but rather to clarify and reiterate the existing electronic surveillance
regime regarding location data.113 It examined the statements of then-FBI
Director Louis Freeh, who had testified at length in response to worries by
privacy advocates that CALEA’s amendments would allow law
enforcement to obtain cell phone tracking data via the Pen Register
Provisions. Specifically, Freeh testified that CALEA was not meant to
“enlarge or reduce the government’s authority [regarding electronic
surveillance],”114 that “‘transactional information’ is . . . exclusively dealt
with in [the SCA],” and that CALEA did not relate to or affect the SCA.115
Freeh’s disclaimer that law enforcement could not obtain location
information through the use of a Pen Register was eventually codified as
Section 1002. Based on these statements, and the lack of crossreferencing between the SCA and the Pen Register Provisions, the court
held that Congress could not have meant the SCA to be the additional
authority required under Section 1002 to obtain location data and thus
rejected the “hybrid theory” application.116
The court concluded by
noting that, should the government wish, it could surely apply for a Rule
41 warrant in order to obtain the cell site data it sought.117

111

Id. at 762 (citing 18 U.S.C. §3127(3) (2004)).
Id.
113
Id. at 765-66 (citing Freiwald, supra note 47).
114
Id. at 763 (quoting Joint Hearing on Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement Access
to Advanced Telecommunications Technologies and Services: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Technology and Law of the Senate Judiciary Comm. and the Subcomm. On
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., at
2, 28 (statement of Director Freeh) (1994) [hereafter Freeh Statement]; see also
Freiwald, supra note 47, at 976-82.
115
Texas Decision, 396 F.Supp.2d at 764. See also Freiwald, supra note 47, at 976-982
(citing Freeh Statement, supra at 27-28.)
116
Id. at 764-65.
117
Id. at 765. As noted below, several courts have denied an application for an order
under the “hybrid theory” and then later granted the same order upon a showing of
probable cause under Rule 41.
112
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C. CASES FOLLOWING THE TEXAS DECISION
[40] To date, more than a dozen decisions have come down either denying
or granting the acquisition of real-time and/or prospective cell site data.
At least seven of those decisions have generally adopted the reasoning of
the Texas Decision, rejected the government’s “hybrid theory,” and denied
the applications.118 Several of these decisions add additional important
analysis and note small disagreements with the Texas Decision, which are
discussed below.
[41] The first court to rule on the issue following the E.D.N.Y. and Texas
Decisions simply held that it was adopting the reasoning of those
decisions and that the court and two fellow Magistrate Judges would not
approve applications for prospective cell site data predicated upon the
authority of the SCA, the Pen Register Provisions, or a combination of the
two.119
118

In re Applications of the United States of America for Orders Authorizing the
Disclosure of Cell Cite Information, Nos. 05-403, 05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05410, 05-411, 2005 WL 3658531 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 26, 2005) [hereinafter D.C. Decision I];
In re Application Of The United States Of America For An Order Authorizing The
Installation & Use Of A Pen Register & A Caller Identification System On Telephone
Numbers [Sealed] & [Sealed] & The Production Of Real Time Cell Site Information, 402
F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2005) [hereinafter Maryland Decision I]; In re Application Of
The United States Of America For An Order Authorizing The Release Of Prospective
Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter D.C. Decision
II]; In re Application Of The United States Of America For An Order Authorizing The
Release Of Prospective Cell Site Information, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(Facciola, M.J.) [hereinafter D.C. Decision III]; Wisconsin Decision, 412 F. Supp. 2d 947
(E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Application Of The United States Of America For An Order
Authorizing The Installation & Use Of A Pen Register &/Or Trap & Trace For Mobile
Identification Number (585) 111-1111 & The Disclosure Of Subscriber & Activity
Information Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter
W.D.N.Y. Decision]; In re Application Of The United States Of America For Orders
Authorizing The Installation & Use Of Pen Registers & Caller Identification Devices On
Telephone Numbers [Sealed] & [Sealed], 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2006) [hereinafter
Maryland Decision II]; In re Application Of The United States For An Order For
Prospective Cell Site Location Information On A Certain Cellular Telephone, No. 06
CRIM. MISC. 01, 2006 WL 468300 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006) [hereinafter S.D.N.Y. II].
119
D.C. Decision I, Nos. 05-403, 05-404, 05-407, 05-408, 05-409, 05-410, 05-411, 2005
WL 3658531. Magistrates Kay and Facciola joined in the decision. Magistrate Facciola
has since weighed in twice on the issue. See D.C. Decision II, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132; D.C.
Decision III, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134.
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[42] Magistrate Bredar soon clarified and narrowed the issues involved
further when he elucidated the important distinction between “real-time”
and “prospective” cell site data: Prospective cell site data consists of all
data recorded by a cellular provider after the issuance of, and pursuant to,
a court order, whereas real-time cell site data consists of “a subset of
‘prospective’ cell site information” that “refers to data used . . . to identity
the location of a phone at the present moment.”120 Because the
government had requested “real-time” cell site data, the court limited its
holding to real-time cell site data, while suggesting that the analysis
probably also applied to all prospective cell site data.121
[43] The Maryland court also discussed in dicta the Fourth Amendment
issues implicated by the acquisition of prospective/real-time cell site data.
The government had argued that it was never required to obtain a warrant
when acquiring cell site data because under Smith v. Maryland cell site
information is “voluntarily” conveyed to a third party.122 The court briefly
suggested that cell site data could be distinguished from numbers dialed
since the cell phone automatically transmits such information, regardless
of whether the user dials a phone and because most users likely aren’t
aware they are transmitting their location.123 The issue of the reasonable
expectation of privacy in prospective cell site information is discussed
further in Section V(B).
[44] As the court recognized, however, since the government had asked
for an order, it must have some statutory basis for granting that order.
Since the SCA and the Pen Register Provisions do not provide that
authority, the court concluded that when the government seeks an order
authorizing the acquisition of real-time cell site data in the future it must
present an affidavit showing probable cause per Rule 41.124 The court
120

Maryland Decision I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 599. The court provides an excellent
example that shows the difference between the two concepts in footnote 5.
121
Id. at 605 n. 11. Indeed, in a follow-up decision, Magistrate Bredar held that the
reasoning of his initial decision on real-time cell site data applied equally to prospective
cell site data. Maryland Decision II, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
122
Maryland Decision I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 605 n. 12.
123
Id. (noting “I do not believe most cell phone possessors realize they can be located
within 100-300 meters any time their phone is turned on.”). See also Texas Decision,
396 F.Supp.2d 747, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
124
Maryland Decision I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
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noted that, immediately following its denial of the present application, the
government presented an affidavit establishing probable cause under Rule
41 and the court issued the requested order.125
[45] Soon thereafter, the government tried a creative new approach, when
it requested prospective cell site data by making a showing of “probable
cause to believe that the requested prospective cell site information is
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”126 The D.C.
court found this “meld[ing]” of the Pen Register Provisions standard with
the constitutional probable cause standard to be amusing, but nonetheless
inadequate.127
The court ultimately found that the “probable cause”
language added nothing to the Pen Register Provisions application and that
the showing did not meet the constitutional “probable cause” standard.128
[46] Less than a month later, the government again sought an order for cell
site data from the same magistrate judge, but this time it “set[] forth facts
demonstrating probable cause to believe that the requested cell site
information is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”
and submitted an affidavit regarding such facts by an investigating
agent.129 The court found that, yet again, the government had missed the
constitutional standard for probable cause: The showing is probable cause
125

Id. at 598 n. 1.
D.C. Decision II, 407 F. Supp. 2d 132,132-33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). The
U.S. Attorney’s Office is a very well organized organization. I assume for the purposes
of this paper that all regional offices act in a concerted manner and that this new approach
was not the result of a “rogue” office, but rather a shift in strategy directed by the main
office.
127
Id. at 133 (“I am afraid that I find the government's chimerical approach unavailing.
Indeed, and to keep the animal metaphor going, it reminds one of the wag who said a
camel is a horse planned by a committee.”)
128
Id. While the decision does not discuss Section 1002, it seems that the government,
recognizing that it could not obtain cell site data “solely” through the Pen Register
Statute, may have believed that by adding the words “probable cause to believe” it had
invoked the Rule 41 standard and therefore added the additional authority Section 1002
required to obtain cell site data.
129
D.C. Decision III, 407 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). This
is one of just three cell site decisions where the court states (albeit in very general terms)
the factual basis underlying the application. Briefly, the affidavit of the investigating
agent described an investigation of a suspected drug dealer and asserted that the
government sought cell site information to determine the location of the suspect’s stash in
another state.
126
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to believe that the information sought is itself evidence of a crime, not that
it is relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.130
D. CASES REJECTING THE E.D.N.Y. AND TEXAS DECISIONS
[47] Not all courts that have encountered this issue have agreed with the
Texas Decision’s analysis – two courts have accepted the government’s
“hybrid theory” while a third granted the government’s application on
other grounds.131 In S.D.N.Y. I, the court first distinguished the facts
before it from those of the then-existing decisions on three grounds: (1)
Whereas in the prior cases, the government had asked for cell site
information during calls and perhaps even when no call was being made
or received, here the government’s application asked only for cell site data
at the beginning and end of each call; (2) whereas in the prior cases, the
government had asked for triangulation data, here the government asked
only for data from a single cell tower at a time (i.e. single cell site data);
and (3) whereas in the prior cases the government had obtained the
information directly, here the cellular provider would be required to give
raw data to the government, which would translate the data into a
spreadsheet.132 The court found these distinctions important because it
meant the government could obtain only general location data and only
when that user dialed the phone (i.e. “voluntarily transmitted” the cell site
data).133
[48] The court examined the Pen Register Provisions and found that the
statute “would by itself provide authority for the order sought by the
Government were it not for [Section 1002].”134 The court reasoned that
the legislative history of Section 1002 shows that Congress understood
130

Id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Louisiana Decision, 411 F.Supp.2d
678 (W.D. La. 2006); In re Application Of The United States Of America For An Order
Authorizing The Installation & Use Of A Pen Register With Caller Identification Device
& Cell Site Location Authority On A Certain Cellular Telephone, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663,
666 (S.D. W.Va. 2006) (Stanley, M.J.) [hereinafter West Virginia Decision]. The West
Virginia Decision is addressed separately in the next section.
132
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 437-38. It is far from clear that the means by which the
government would obtain cell site data under the application in this case is any different
from how it would have obtained cell site data in any of the other reported decisions.
133
Id. at 449-50.
134
Id. at 440.
131
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that prospective cellular location data could, prior to the passage of
Section 1002, be obtained under the Pen Register Provisions.135 Working
backwards, the court first found that a pen register is the only physical
device that could obtain prospective cell site data and therefore if Section
1002 were meant to remove the government’s ability to obtain cell site
data through using a pen register, whether combined with other authority
or not, the government would have no means of obtaining prospective cell
site data.136 Because it believed that Congress could not have meant to
take away the government’s ability to obtain prospective cell site data, the
court held that the term “solely pursuant” means that the government can
obtain prospective cell site data “through some unexplained combination
of the Pen Register Provisions with some other unspecified
mechanism.”137
[49] The court next turned to the SCA and determined that, under the plain
language of the statute, cell site data is “‘information’ . . . in the form of a
‘record’” because it is first created by the cellular provider and then sent to
the government.138 The court rejected the theory that the “service” being
provided by the cellular provider was that of a “tracking device” and
instead held that the “service” was cellular voice and data services.139
Finally, the court explained that, at least under the specific facts of the
present case, the SCA could be used to obtain prospective cell site data
because the service provider was storing the data before handing it to the
government. The court reasoned that even under a very narrow reading of
the SCA, “the Government [could] present[] daily or hourly (or even more
frequent) applications to the Court to obtain historical cell site data.”140
135

Id. at 440-41.
Id. at 441-42. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 provides that government cannot install a pen register
except under the authority of the Pen Register Statute (and, though not relevant here,
FISA).
137
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 442-43. While it accepted the proposition that the Pen
Register Provisions must be combined with some other “unspecified mechanism” to
obtain prospective cell site data, the court seemed uncomfortable with this statutory
interpretation, calling it “unsatisfying[]” and “unattractive”, but nonetheless adopted it
because the alternative interpretations would lead to absurd results.
138
Id. at 447.
139
Id. at 444-45.
140
Id. at 447. This reveals an inherent problem with applying traditional principles of
surveillance to electronic communications and related transactional information: The
difference between intercepting an electronic communication or related transactional
136
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Further, the court reasoned if one accepts that the Pen Register Provisions
are a necessary component for obtaining prospective cell site data, then the
SCA is the perfect statute to combine with the Pen Register Provisions
because together they allow the acquisition of “records” by a pen register
device using the higher legal standard of the SCA with the time limit
protections of the Pen Register Provisions.141
[50] The court rejected any Fourth Amendment constitutional protection
as applied in this case for several reasons. First, the court reasoned
information provided “in this District” consisted of only very general
location data, as opposed to “pinpoint” data.142 The court distinguished
Karo because the cell site data was not accurate enough to disclose the
user’s location within a home and because, unlike Karo, “the Government
does not seek to install [a] ‘tracking device:’ The individual has chosen to
carry a device and to permit transmission of its information to a third
party….”143
[51] The court ultimately accepted the “hybrid theory,” at least as applied
to the particular application the government presented. Realizing that
technology could and probably would change in the near future, the court
limited its holding by restricting what information it would grant in the
future under a “hybrid theory” application. The court stated that in the
future it would sign only orders that required the production of:
(1) information regarding cell site location
that consists of the tower receiving
transmissions from the target phone (and
any information on what portion of that
information and obtaining stored versions of the same electronic communication or
related transactional information is almost nonexistent. I discuss this issue in further
detail in Section V(B)(3).
141
Id. at 448. The court agreed that the SCA is “unsuited” for an order authorizing
ongoing acquisition of cell site data because of its lack of time limitations and its
retrospective nature but found that when combined with the Pen Register Statute, the
SCA adopts the time limitations and prospective aspects of that statute. Id. at 447-48.
142
Id. at 449.
143
Id. The court cited Smith v. Maryland for this proposition, but did not reach the
question of whether cell site data is “voluntarily conveyed” when the user is not making
or receiving a call, since the government in this case requested only cell site data at the
beginning and end of calls. Id. at 449-50.
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tower is receiving a transmission, if
available); (2) tower information that is tied
to a particular telephone call made or
received by the user; and (3) information
that is transmitted from the provider to the
Government.144
[52] The court concluded that, should the government wish to obtain any
other or more exact cell site data, such as triangulation cell site data or cell
site data during a call, it would need to “provide additional briefing on
why such information is permissible under the relevant authorities.”145
[53] One court has since followed and adopted the reasoning of this
case.146 A Louisiana court also briefly examined the issue of GPS
technology, finding that several cell phone companies, including Nextel,
have cell phones that use GPS technology.147 However, since the
government was not requesting GPS data, the court did not reach the issue
of whether such information could be obtained through a “hybrid theory”
application. The court specifically limited its holding and expressly stated
that the government was not allowed to obtain following information:
(1) any cell site information that might be
available when the user's cell phone was
turned “on” but a call was not in progress;
(2) information that would allow the
Government to triangulate multiple tower
locations and thereby pinpoint the location
144

Id. at 550. I do not find the court’s limiting language particularly helpful. There is no
practical difference between obtaining cell site data from a single cell site at the time a
call is placed/received and obtaining cell site data from multiple cell sites during a call.
For instance, law enforcement agents could create a software program that dialed the
user’s cell phone every ten seconds and then hang up before the cell phone user actually
heard a ring (the practice of “pinging” a phone.) Each call would create a single cell site
record which, in the aggregate, would provide the same cell site data as a pen register that
recorded cell site data continuously. See, e.g., Forest, supra note 66, at 947 (police
“pinged” defendant’s phone several times, hanging up before the defendant’s phone
rang).
145
S.D.N.Y. I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 480.
146
Louisiana Decision, 411 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D. La. 2006).
147
Id. at 681.
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of the user; and (3) GPS information on the
location of the user, even if that technology
is built into the user's cell phone.148
E. VARIATION ON THE THEME
[54] One court has approved an application for prospective cell site data
on completely different grounds than all others. In the West Virginia
Decision, the court held that, because the current possessor of the cell
phone was not the subscriber, the Pen Register Provisions by themselves
provided the required authority to obtain prospective cell site data.149 The
current possessor of the cell phone was a fugitive who was neither the
subscriber nor the owner of the phone.150 The court rejected the “hybrid
theory” but granted the application because it found that, under the plain
language of the statute, the exception in Section 1002 applies only to “the
physical location of the subscriber.”151 Since the current “user” was not a
“subscriber,” the court held that the exception in Section 1002 did not
apply and therefore the Pen Register Provisions, by itself, provided the
requisite authority to obtain cell site information.152
F. SUMMARY
[55] The courts have split on whether a “hybrid theory” application (i.e. an
application for an order under the combined authority of the Pen Register
Provisions and the SCA) is sufficient to allow the government to obtain
prospective and/or real-time cell site data. The majority of courts that
have addressed the issue have held, based upon the legislative history, the
structure of the statutory scheme, and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
that a “hybrid theory” application does not present the requisite authority
for the government to obtain prospective cell site data. Two courts have
dissented, approving “hybrid theory” applications on the narrow
148

Id. at 683.
West Virginia Decision, 415 F. Supp. 2d 663, 666 (S.D. W.Va. 2006).
150
Id. at 664. It is unclear whether the fugitive had stolen the cellular phone or simply
borrowed a friend’s cellular phone.
151
Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
152
Id. at 665-66. This case did not really approve of the “hybrid theory” (indeed, it
rejected the theory) but approved the application solely upon the authority of the Pen
Register Statute under the narrow facts of the case.
149
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applications before them, on the grounds that the Pen Register Provisions
are a required component of any application for prospective cell site data,
and that the SCA provides the additional authority required to obtain such
data. A third court has approved an application for prospective cell site
data on the narrow grounds that the statutory exception embodied in
Section 1002 did not apply because the “user” of the cell phone was not
the owner or subscriber of that cell phone, and thus, the Pen Register
Provisions by itself provided the requisite authority to obtain prospective
cell site data. To date, none of these decisions has been appealed,
notwithstanding several courts’ suggestion to the government to do so.153
V. WHAT STANDARD SHOULD A COURT APPLY?
A. INTRODUCTION
[56] At this time the government does not seem to be able to obtain cell
site data (or any other cellular tracking data) directly using its own
devices.154 Since cellular providers are unlikely to voluntarily provide cell
site data directly to government, the government must obtain an order
directing the cellular providers’ assistance in obtaining cell site data.155

153

See S.D.N.Y. II, No. 06 CRIM. MISC. 01 2006 WL 468300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Texas Decision, 396 F.Supp.2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005). It seems the U.S. Attorney’s
Office has made a conscious decision not to appeal any of these decisions. I believe the
reason for this is that many magistrate judges are unfamiliar with the issue and still grant
“hybrid theory” applications without written opinions, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office is
unwilling to risk negative higher court case law on this issue.
154
If the government could do so, it would not need to apply for an order requiring
cellular providers to provide help to the government in obtaining this information.
155
While it seems one or more telecommunications providers have voluntarily provided
some information to government agencies without a consumer’s approval (see, e.g.,
Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY,
May 11, 2006 at 1A), this author believes cellular providers are unlikely to give law
enforcement prospective cell site data voluntarily for three reasons: (1) The enormous
costs of complying with multiple requests from law enforcement agencies across the
country; (2) the existence of privacy clauses in end-user cellular phone contracts (see,
e.g., T-Mobile Terms & Conditions, available online at http://www.tmobile.com/Templates/Popup.aspx?PAsset=Ftr_Ftr_TermsAndConditions&print=true, at
paragraph 16 (last visited May 9, 2007)); and (3) the possibility of strong consumer
backlash if consumers were made aware of the cellular providers’ actions.
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[57] My analysis of which standard a court must apply in determining
whether to grant an order authorizing the government to obtain
prospective cell site data necessarily begins with dividing the issue into
two parts: the statutory requirements to obtain an order (discussed in
Section V(B)) and the constitutional restrictions, if any, on obtaining such
data without a court order (discussed in Section V(C)). The statutory
analysis assumes that, at least as to the acquisition of some cell site data,
there are no constitutional restrictions. Section V(B) analyzes the
statutory basis for obtaining an order requiring cellular providers to
provide the government with prospective cell site data. In contrast,
Section V(C) discusses constitutional restrictions, if any, on both the
government’s independent acquisition of cell site data and upon its
acquisition of cell site data through cellular service providers.156
B. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
[58] As stated above in Section III(B), the statutory scheme setup by the
ECPA (as amended) allows the government to obtain several types of
electronic data: (1) the contents of electronic communications (“Wiretap
Act”);157 (2) stored communications, subscriber and transactional records
(SCA);158 (3) dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information (“Pen
Register Provisions”);159 and (4) tracking device data (“Tracking Device
Statute”).160 I consider whether each section provides the necessary
authority to obtain prospective cell site data below.
1. WIRETAP ACT
[59] The Wiretap Act seems to be a poor candidate for obtaining cell site
data. While the term “electronic communications” is defined very broadly

156

There is no significant legal difference between the government obtaining cell site
data directly or through the cellular provider. In the latter case, the cellular provider acts
as an agent of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740, n. 4 (1979).
157
18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2522 (2006).
158
18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).
159
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006).
160
18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2006).
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under the Wiretap Act,161 the Wiretap Act covers only the interception (i.e.
real-time acquisition) of the “contents [of electronic communications],” a
term which is defined as “any information concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of [a particular electronic] communication….”162
[60] Cellular telephones transmit an array of “communications” including
voice communications, text messages, emails, instant messages, and other
internet communications. The “contents” of these “communications” are
spoken words (voice communications) and combinations of text and
pictures (text messages, emails, instant messages, and other internet
communications). All of these “contents” are expressions created directly
by humans and communicated to/from another human (directly or
indirectly).163 Cell site data is an electronic communication in that it is a
“transfer of . . . [a] signal . . . by a . . . radio” but it is not contents because
it is automatically-generated data transmitted from a cellular handset – not
a communication created directly by a human and communicated to
another human.164 I disagree with Magistrate Smith and several other
courts’ conclusion that, because the cell site data can be used to track an
individual, that converts the cellular phone into a “tracking device” whose
“communications” are exempted from the definition of “electronic
communications.”165
[61] Few, if any, cell phone users carry a cellular telephone for the
purpose of sending tracking data to the cellular provider. Few, if any, cell
phone users would consider their cell phone a “tracking device,” at least
161

“Electronic Communications” is defined as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing,
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate
or foreign commerce, but does not include-(A) any wire or oral communication; (B) any communication made through a tone-only
paging device; (C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117
of this title); or (D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution
in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds…” 18
U.S.C.S. § 2510(12) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
162
18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).
163
See, Freiwald, supra note 47, at 957 (noting that “judges are used to thinking of
communications as requiring two human parties,” but noting the blurry line between
contents and non-contents.)
164
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
165
See, e.g., Texas Decision, 396 F.Supp.2d 747, 754 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
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prior to learning about the cell site decisions discussed in this paper. The
primary use of a cell phone is to send voice and data communications
from person to person. Any cell site data sent from the cellular phone is
merely data generated incidental to cellular communications and not
communications themselves.166
[62] Moreover, the definition of “electronic communications” specifically
excludes “communications from a tracking device,” so even if it could be
argued that cell site data turns a cellular phone into a “tracking device,”
law enforcement could not obtain the contents of a communication (i.e.
the cell site data) from that tracking device through the Wiretap Act.167
[63] While the Electronic Frontier Foundation and other commentators
have urged the courts to require a government agency seeking prospective
cell site data to make the same showing and endure the same limitations
imposed on the interception of electronic communications under the
Wiretap Act,168 the law does not seem to support the Wiretap Act
provisions as a basis for obtaining cell site data.
2. PEN REGISTER PROVISIONS
[64] Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act in 2001 the terms “pen register”
and “trap and trace device” were defined narrowly under the Pen Register
Provisions.169 Under the original ECPA version of the statute, a pen
register was defined as:
a device which records or decodes electronic
or other impulses which identify the
numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on
166

See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 47, at 954 (“In general, communication attributes
comprise information disclosing the event of the communication and fleshing out details
of that event.”).
167
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
168
See Brief for the Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting
defendants, In re Application for Pen Register on Trap and Trace Device with Cell Site
Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005); Memorandum from Susan
Freiwald, Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law, to Author (2006) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Freiwald Memo].
169
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b) & (d) (2006).
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the telephone line to which such device is
attached, but such term does not include any
device used by a provider or customer of a
wire or electronic communication service
for billing, or recording as an incident to
billing, for communications services
provided by such provider or any device
used by a provider or customer of a wire
communication service for cost accounting
or other like purposes in the ordinary course
of its business[.]170
[65] The first part of the definition (the text before “but”) was changed by
the Patriot Act to read “a device or process which records or decodes
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is
transmitted.”171
[66] This expanded definition, by itself, would seem to include cell site
data since it is “routing [and] signaling information,” information sent
from the handset which assists the cellular provider in routing the
communications to and from the handset and transmitting such signals.172
Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, however, Congress passed CALEA
which added 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B).173 As discussed earlier, Section
1002 provides that information disclosing the physical location of a
subscriber (other than the phone number itself) cannot be obtained solely
through the use of the Pen Register Provisions.174 There is no indication
in the legislative history of the Patriot Act that the amendment to Section
170

18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3), Pub.L. 107-56, Title II,
§ 216(c)(1) to (4), Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 290.
171
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
172
See, e.g., Maryland Decision II, 416 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (D. Md. 2006) (quoting
United States Telecom Ass’n. v. F.C.C., 227 F.3d 450, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (“[A]
mobile phone sends signals to the nearest cell site at the start and end of a call. These
signals, which are necessary to achieve communications between the caller and the party
he or she is calling, clearly are signaling information.”) (citations omitted).
173
47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B); see generally Freiwald, supra note 47.
174
47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added); Texas Decision, 396 F.Supp.2d 747,
757-58 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
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3127(3) (adding DRAS to the definition of “pen register”) was meant to
overrule Section 1002.175 Thus, while the Pen Register Provisions, as
amended by the Patriot Act, seem by themselves to provide the authority
for government acquisition of cell site data, that authority is explicitly
limited by Section 1002.176
Additionally, the pen register definition
explicitly exempts from its scope:
any device or process used by a provider or
customer of a wire or electronic
communication service for billing, or
recording as an incident to billing, for
communications services provided by such
provider or any device or process used by a
provider or customer of a wire
communication service for cost accounting
or other like purposes in the ordinary course
of its business.177
[67] Cellular providers keep records of at least some cell site information
by themselves for billing and “other like” business purposes, such as
deciding where to build new cell sites or determining when to bill a user
for “roaming” charges.178 If cell site data is collected regularly in such a
manner, it is not within the scope of information a pen register is
authorized to obtain.
3. STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
[68] The Stored Communications Act provides authority to obtain “Stored
Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records
175

See, e.g., Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
One court has in fact already found that the authority of the Pen Register statute, by
itself, is enough to obtain prospective cell site data. West Virginia Decision, 415 F. Supp.
2d 663 (S.D. W.Va. 2006), discussed further in Section IV(D), supra.
177
18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
178
This author has spoken with two engineers in the cellular technology field about this
issue, one of whom works for Nortel Networks and the other for a major Canadian
cellular technology provider. Each stated that he knew of several cellular service
providers who record at least some cell cite data for billing and quality-assurance
purposes. [Names withheld on request].
176
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Access.”179 Under the SCA, stored records are split into three categories:
(1) Stored communications stored less than 180 days; (2) stored
communications stored more than 180 days; and (3) transactional and
subscriber information.180
Since the SCA adopts the definition of
“contents” from the Wiretap Act and since cell site data is not “contents”
under the Wiretap Act, the first two categories of stored communications
are irrelevant for this analysis.181
The government may obtain
“subscriber” information using a simple administrative subpoena;
however, subscriber information is limited to six narrow categories of
information, none of which are related to cell site data.182
[69] The final category of records under the SCA protects “transactional”
records or “[r]ecords concerning electronic communication service or
remote computing service.”183 An “electronic communication service” is
“any service which provides users thereof the ability to send or receive
wire or electronic communications.”184 An “electronic communication”
has the same definition as in the Wiretap Act.185 This very broad
definition includes transfers of “signals,” “images” or “data” through
“radio,” which would seem to include cellular voice and data
communications.186 Thus the SCA covers transactional records from
cellular service providers.187
[70] The next step is to determine what records are actually covered under
the transactional records section of the SCA. The legislative history
shows that transactional records comprise “information about the
customer's use of the service” other than the content of the user’s

179

This is the official title of Chapter 121 of Title 18 of the United States Code.
18 U.S.C. § 2703.
181
18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (adopting, by reference, the definitions from the Wiretap Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2510); Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 758 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
182
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2); Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
183
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).
184
18 U.S.C. § 2510(15).
185
See supra note 146.
186
18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). This definition also excludes tracking device communications,
but this is irrelevant since I have rejected the notion that the acquisition of cell site data
turns a cellular telephone into a “tracking device” whose “communications” are the cell
site data. See supra note 148.
187
Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
180

35

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 4

communications.188 One court, addressing the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 2709
(covering FBI counterintelligence access to subscriber and transactional
records), concluded that Section 2709 “does not require communication
service providers to create records which they do not maintain in the
ordinary course of business.”189 While this case describes the scope of
the term “telephone toll billing records,” the same reasoning should apply
to transactional records under Section 2703(c) – that is, the government
may obtain through a Section 2703(c)(1) order only records that the
cellular service provider creates and maintains in the ordinary course of
business.190
[71] Under this reasoning, the government should be able to obtain
historical cell site data under Section 2703(c)(1) so long as that
information is regularly created and maintained in the ordinary course of
business. Recent court decisions and publicly available documents do not
specifically indicate how much data is recorded and how long that data is
maintained. However, it is clear that at least some cellular providers
record and maintain cell site data since such data has been used in a
variety of cases already.191 Cellular providers most likely keep at least
188

S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 38, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3592; Texas
Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
189
In Re Matter of Grand Jury Subpoenas to Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, 894
F.Supp 355, 348-49 (W.D. Mo. 1995). There is nothing to suggest that the subscriber
and transactional data covered under 18 U.S.C. § 2709 is any different than that covered
under Section 2703(c).
190
See, e.g., Freiwald Memo, supra note 168, at 5-6 (discussing In re Grand Jury
Subpoena to Southwestern Bell Mobile Systems, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Mo.
1995), and the applicability of the legislative history of Section 2709 to 2703.)
191
See, e.g., People v. Stovall, No. B172771, 2005 WL 977733 (Cal. Ct. App. April 28,
2005) (expert testimony regarding suspect’s location at time of murder based upon
Verizon billing records showing defendant had made and received several calls using two
cell sites in the vicinity of the murder location); People v. Pese, No. A100933, 2004 WL
899768 (Cal. Ct. App. April 28, 2004) (cell phone records showed defendant made
several calls using cell sites in vicinity of the location where victim’s body was found).
See also examples in Who Knows Where You’ve Been supra note 15, at 310-12. The
author has worked on a large federal RICO conspiracy case where the government had
obtained historical cell site records and planned to use such records as evidence that one
or more defendants were in the vicinity of a crime scene. The author has also heard
anecdotal evidence from several criminal defense attorneys who regularly represent
clients in federal court that the U.S. Attorney’s Office regularly obtains such information
for use as evidence at trial in serious felony cases.
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some of this information for later analysis in determining trends in usage
in order to determine the best methods of routing and where additional cell
site towers are required.192
[72] Unfortunately for the government, the structure and plain text (and
title) of the SCA show that it is of a purely historical nature and therefore
unfit for authorizing the acquisition of prospective and/or real-time
records. As noted by several courts, the SCA needs to be examined as part
of the overall surveillance scheme setup by the ECPA.193 The Wiretap
Act and the Pen Register Provisions necessarily cover real-time (or at least
prospective) access to data, since they require “interception” – which has
been construed by several courts to mean acquisition contemporaneous (or
at least nearly contemporaneous) with transmission.194 Because they are
prospective in nature, both the Wiretap Act and the Pen Register
Provisions require that interception be authorized only for a limited time
and because they reflect on-going investigations, they are at least
temporarily sealed.195 In contrast, the SCA has no time limitations of any
sort (other than relating to the standard required for obtaining the contents
of stored communications stored for more or less than 180 days). Thus,
the plain statutory language of the SCA and the statutory scheme in which
it was created show that the SCA was meant to cover the acquisition of
solely retrospective – and not prospective – data.196
[73] One final issue is worth discussing in the context of the SCA: The
blurring of the line between “records” and “real-time” data. If the
government can obtain historical cell site data using an SCA order, what
prevents the government from obtaining a new order every week, every
day, or even every hour to obtain any records which have been created in
192

T-Mobile’s own Privacy Notice contemplates future potential use of cell site data for
commercial/advertising and service-related uses. See What About Location-Based
Services and Information, T-Mobile, Privacy Notice, http://support.tmobile.com/knowbase/root/public/tm22030.htm, (last accessed May 9, 2007).
193
See, e.g., Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 760.
194
U.S. v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039,1048-49 (11th Cir. 2003); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines,
302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002); Steven Jackson Games v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d
457, 463 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1994).
195
18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(5), (8)(b) (1993 & Supp. 2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3123(c) (1993 &
Supp. 2006).
196
Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 760.
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the time since the last order?197 Electronic information is converted into a
“record” almost immediately. If the service provider regularly keeps those
“records,” what does the “pen register” device actually do? Is it merely a
piece of software that waits for new records to be created and transmits the
new records to law enforcement on an ongoing basis? Or does it actually
“intercept” the data before it becomes a record and then send that
information to law enforcement? These questions remain unanswered.
For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to note that, while the
statutory language of the SCA may allow repeated orders on even an
hourly basis, at some point a court is likely to enforce the spirit of the
ECPA by finding this practice to be a de facto “interception.”
4. TRACKING DEVICE STATUTE
[74] Several court decisions have cited the Tracking Device Statute as a
potential source of authority for obtaining an order authorizing the
acquisition of real-time cell site data.198 While at first blush it seems like
the most logical match, in reality the Tracking Device Statute does not
authorize anything and is merely a left-over statute.
[75] Prior to the passage of the Tracking Device Statute, Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure Rule 41 did not expressly authorize the monitoring of
a tracking device outside of the jurisdiction which had authorized the
order.199 The Tracking Device Statute thus clarified that, where a court
was already empowered to grant a warrant for the installation of a tracking
device, it could also authorize the monitoring of the tracking device
outside of that jurisdiction.200 Since that time, Rule 41 has been amended
to allow exactly what the Tracking Device Statute authorized.201
[76] Additionally, as several courts have noted, the Tracking Device
Statute “does not prohibit the use of a tracking device in the absence of
conformity with the section . . . [n]or does it bar the use of evidence
197

S.D.N.Y. Decision I, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
See, e.g., E.D.N.Y. Decision II, 396 F.Supp. 2d 294, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Texas
Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 743.
199
See United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 758 n. 2 (D.C. Cir. 2000); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41; Lee, supra note 15 at 395.
200
Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758 n. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (1993 & Supp. 2006).
201
Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758 n. 2; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
198
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acquired without a [Tracking Device Statute] order.”202 The Gbemisola
court examined the legislative history of the statute and found that
Congress was aware that the Knotts holding allowed warrantless
installation and monitoring of a tracking device on public highways.203
Congress therefore knew of the lax constitutional limitations on the use of
tracking devices in non-constitutionally-protected areas but did not expand
the constitutional protection, other than to broaden the jurisdictional reach
of a warrant.
[77] The government has argued in several cases that cell site data is so
imprecise that it does not “permit the tracking of the movement of a
person or objective.”204 Any discussion of the precision or accuracy of
cell site data in determining location in the context of the Tracking Device
Statute is irrelevant for several reasons. First, neither the plain language
of the statute, nor the legislative history say anything about accuracy.205
Second, technology is progressing at such a quick pace that any arguments
that cell site data is not precise enough to count as a tracking device will
soon become moot, if they are not already.206 Third, the fact that the
government seeks the cell site data at all shows it is accurate enough to be
of use (whether evidentiary or otherwise) to the government.
[78] The Tracking Device Statute neither sets a requirement for the
installation and monitoring of a tracking device, nor does it expand the
constitutional protection against the use of tracking devices. As a result, it
is not really a part of the statutory “scheme” setup by the ECPA and is
therefore irrelevant to determining the proper standard the government
must meet in order to obtain real-time cell site data.

202

See, e.g., Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758; Forest, supra note 66, at 950 (quoting
Gbemisola).
203
Gbemisola, 225 F.3d at 758 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, at 60 (1986)).
204
Maryland Decision I, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (D. Md. 2005). See also Texas
Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“The government resists
categorizing cell site data in the hands of service providers as information from a tracking
device, because it does not provide “detailed” location information.”).
205
See 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2006).
206
Maryland Decision I, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 599, n. 4.
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5. COMBINED AUTHORITY OF PEN REGISTER PROVISIONS AND STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT
[79] Having determined that neither the Pen Register Provisions nor the
SCA, by themselves, authorize the acquisition of prospective cell site data,
I now turn to the “hybrid theory” set forth by the government in the
several cases discussed above in Section IV. The “hybrid theory” asserts
that, while Section 1002 prohibits the acquisition of prospective cell site
data “solely pursuant to” the Pen Register Provisions, the government
merely needs to add some additional authority in order to get over the
hurdle set up by Section 1002.207 The government has contended that the
SCA provides such additional authority.208
[80] Combining two statutes, neither of which individually authorizes
something, to obtain the authority to authorize that thing is a novel idea.
One commentator has attacked this theory on the grounds that “0 + 0 =
0”.209 The government, in support of its hybrid theory, has never cited
another similar arrangement, where two independent statutes are
combined to obtain a result that neither authorizes separately.210 This
“hybrid theory” is distinguishable from the regular practice of law
enforcement of combining applications and orders for separate results.
For instance, combining a Pen Register application and order in the same
packet as a SCA application and order to obtain (respectively) the results
of a pen register and some stored records is not problematic. In that
situation, the Pen Register Provisions independently provides the authority
to obtain numbers dialed, whereas the SCA independently provides the
authority to obtain stored records.
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See, e.g., id. at 603.
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Freiwald Memo, supra note 168. See also Press Release, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, New Case Reveals Routine Abuse of Government Surveillance Powers: Cell
Phones Used to Track Users Without Probable Cause (Sept. 26, 2005) (“It’s as if the
government wants the court to believe that zero plus zero somehow equals one.”),
available at, http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2005_09.php#004002.
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See, e.g., Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 764-65 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[N]o other
form of electronic surveillance has the mixed statutory parentage that prospective cell site
data is claimed to have.”)
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[81] Even more problematic, while they were originally enacted
concurrently, the SCA and the Pen Register Provisions make no crossreferences to each other.211 The 1986 Congress which passed the ECPA
must have known how to cross-reference statutes when needed, as it crossreferenced both the Pen Register Provisions and the SCA with the Wiretap
Act.212 If that Congress had meant for the two statutory schemes to be
combined to obtain something neither authorized independently, it seems
likely that Congress would have done so at that time.213 When CALEA
amended the statutory scheme by adding Section 1002, it did so without
adding any reference in Section 1002 to the SCA. Presumably, the 1994
Congress which passed CALEA would have explicitly made such a
reference if had meant the term “solely pursuant to [the Pen Register
Provisions]” to mean, without additional authority provided by the
SCA.214 The more likely scenario is that Congress meant to leave the door
open for a later statute which would authorize the acquisition of cell site
data by the technical device known as a pen register but using a different
standard. Since the SCA existed in 1994 and its scope has not been
enlarged enough since then to independently authorize the acquisition of
real-time cell site data, the 1994 Congress simply could not have meant
the SCA to provide the extra authority required under Section 1002.
[82] Much has been said by courts and commentators about the testimony
of then-FBI Director Louis Freeh during the congressional hearings on
CALEA.215 Freeh testified that CALEA was not meant to “enlarge or
reduce the government’s authority” but merely to “maintain[] the status
quo”.216 If CALEA was meant to protect the status quo, and prior to its
211

Id. at 764.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (2006) (adopting, by reference, the definitions from the
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510); 18 U.S.C. § 3127(1) (adopting, by reference, several
definitions from the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510).
213
Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 764-65 (noting that “[i]f these various statutory
provisions were intended to give birth to a new breed of electronic surveillance, one
would expect Congress to have openly acknowledged paternity somewhere along the
way.”)
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Id. at 757 (emphasis added).
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See, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 47, at 979-80; Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 76365; E.D.N.Y. Decision II, 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 763 (quoting from Joint Hearing on Digital
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passage the status quo included no device whereby the SCA and Pen
Register Provisions could be combined to obtain prospective cell site data,
it is hard to see how Section 1002 could authorize this new combination.
For the purposes of this paper, it is enough to merely recognize that Freeh
never suggested that the Pen Register Provisions could be combined with
another statute to obtain prospective cell site data, nor do the
congressional reports on CALEA mention such a combination.
[83] Thus, the plain language of the statutes, the structure of the statutory
scheme, and common sense show that the “hybrid theory,” that is the
combination of the authority of the Pen Register Provisions and the
authority of the SCA to obtain prospective cell site data, is unsupported by
the law.
6. COMBINED AUTHORITY OF PEN REGISTER PROVISIONS AND RULE 41
WARRANT
[84] The final means of obtaining prospective cell site data is to use a Rule
41 warrant. Most of the courts addressing this issue have required the
government to bring an application for a Rule 41 warrant with the
requisite probable cause showing in order to obtain prospective cell site
data.217 Rule 41 allows a law enforcement officer to obtain a warrant for:
(1) evidence of a crime;
(2) contraband, fruits of crime, or other
items illegally possessed;
(3) property designed for use, intended for
use, or used in committing a crime; or
(4) a person to be arrested or a person who is
unlawfully restrained.218
[85] In order to obtain a warrant, law enforcement must present evidence
(through an affidavit or testimony) showing probable cause.219 Of the four
the Senate Judiciary Comm. and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Judiciary Comm., 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 2, 28 (statement of Director Freeh)).
217
See, e.g., Texas Decision, 396 F.Supp.2d at 765 ; E.D.N.Y. Decision II, 396 F.Supp. at
326-27; Maryland Decision I, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (D. Md. 2005); W.D.N.Y.
Decision, 415 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
218
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(C).
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types of warrants, cell site data fits only one category: evidence of a crime.
There is nothing in the ECPA or any other federal statute which prohibits
the use of a warrant to obtain cell site data.
[86] Law enforcement does not, however, seem able to obtain cell site data
by itself, but must obtain it through the cellular provider. To obtain cell
site data, law enforcement officers need an order requiring the cellular
provider to provide them with such information. A warrant merely allows
the search and seizure of evidence. A warrant would allow a law
enforcement officer to enter the premises and obtain the information
directly from the cellular provider. On the other hand, cellular providers
can easily comply with a warrant for prospective cell site data by simply
installing a piece of software which is, in essence, a pen register.
[87] For all practical purposes, then, a Rule 41 warrant authorizing the
search and seizure of cell site data for an individual is merely an order to
the cellular provider to install its own pen register and send the results to
law enforcement.
For this reason, the government may find it
advantageous to apply for both a warrant and a pen register order at the
same time, with the warrant providing the authority to use the pen register
for the acquisition of prospective cell site data. Ultimately, the
government’s “hybrid theory” is correct, except that the additional
authority required by Section 1002 is a Rule 41 warrant. The difference in
the “hybrid theory” here is that, whereas neither the SCA nor the Pen
Register Provisions provide the authority to obtain the results (prospective
cell site data), here the warrant provides the authority to obtain the results,
and the Pen Register Provisions merely provides a physical device or
means for obtaining that result.
7. SUMMARY
[88] The Wiretap Act does not provide the authority for obtaining cell site
data because it applies solely to “contents” of communications, and cell
site data is not the “contents” of a communication. The Pen Register
Provisions do seem to provide the authority for obtaining cell site data,
except for the fact that Section 1002 explicitly precludes the Pen Register
Provisions from providing that authority. The Stored Communications
219
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Act provides the authority for obtaining historical cell site data that
cellular providers regularly keep, but given its plain language and its
context within the larger statutory structure of the ECPA, it cannot provide
the authority for obtaining prospective cell site data. The Tracking Device
Statute is neither mandatory nor prohibits the installation and monitoring
of tracking devices. The Tracking Device Statute itself merely clarified a
hole in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 41 which has since been
filled. The combination of the Pen Register Provisions and the SCA is not
enough to obtain prospective cell site data since neither statute separately
provides sufficient authority to obtain such data. Moreover, the legislative
history and the structure of the statutes do not support the contention that
Congress ever meant for such a combination of authority. Finally, a Rule
41 warrant provides sufficient authority to obtain prospective cell site
data. A cellular provider is likely to implement a Rule 41 warrant for cell
site data through the use of a device like a pen register, so law
enforcement should combine a Rule 41 warrant application with a pen
register application and order.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
[89] Separate from the statutory issue is the issue of whether the
acquisition of prospective cell phone tracking data implicates the
protections of the Fourth Amendment. Prospective cell site data
implicates two separate levels of Fourth Amendment analysis: (1)
Whether the cell phone user retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his cell site data; and (2) whether a cell phone user has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his location in a public or private place.
[90] The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from searches and
seizures where that individual has a subjective expectation of privacy and
that expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable.220 Knotts and Karo
together hold that, while a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in their location while in a public place, that person does retain a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their location once they enter into a
home.221 More recently, the Supreme Court reinforced the notion of the
220

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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home as a special constitutionally-protected zone in holding that a senseenhancing device constituted a search, notwithstanding that the device
never intruded into the home.222
[91] On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that warrantless
interception of telephone numbers dialed does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.223 This is because, the court reasoned, a person could have
no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in information (in that
case, the telephone numbers) which has been “voluntarily conveyed” to a
third party (there the telephone company), and the subscriber knows that
the telephone company can and does record those numbers.224
[92] The government has argued, relying on Smith v. Maryland, that cell
site data does not implicate the Fourth Amendment because, like
telephone numbers, it is “voluntarily conveyed.”225 The problem with this
argument is that, unlike telephone numbers which the user must actively
dial and send to the telephone company, cell site tracking data is
automatically transmitted, regardless of whether the person is using the
cell phone at the time.226 This information must be transmitted in order to
use the device because the device must always communicate with a
particular cell tower in order to receive incoming calls or make outgoing
calls.227 Cell site data is not information which the user contemplates
sending when walking or driving around with a cell phone, nor does the
user ever enter this information himself, as is the case with telephone
numbers. Additionally, few cellular phone users are likely to know that
their movements can be tracked with substantial accuracy at any time their
cellular phones are turned on.228 Thus cell phone users seem to retain a
subjective expectation of privacy.
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United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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See Texas Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 756 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
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Id. at 756-57.
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Id. at 750-51.
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It is true that many cell phone users may know that their location can be tracked when
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[93] It could also be argued, relying on Knotts and Karo, that the Fourth
Amendment is not violated by warrantless acquisition of prospective cell
site data since it does not provide sufficiently accurate or precise
information to show whether a person is inside a residence or in a public
place.229 While this may or may not be true under current technology, it
will not remain that way. Technology advances at such a fast pace that
legislation and even court decisions often cannot keep up.230
Triangulation techniques and GPS technology are likely to continually
improve to the point where law enforcement may be able to determine a
person’s exact location within a residence.231 Even today, if the
government seeks GPS information (which may or may not be transmitted
automatically on a regular basis) from a cell phone handset the
government may be able to determine the location of that handset within
the home with a high degree of accuracy.232
[94] An argument can also be made that users have an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell site data due to privacy
clauses in cellular service contracts and privacy policies. For instance, TMobile’s current Privacy Notice states that T-Mobile only discloses
“location information [cell site data] to third parties when required to do
so,” such as during emergency situations (when user has dialed 911), to
law enforcement, or to a user’s guardian or immediate family members in
emergency situations.233 Verizon Wireless goes further by stating, “We
support notice and informed consent for the use of any personally
identifiable wireless location and transactional information [cell site data].
We will not store this type of information beyond its normal useful life,
229
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Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, Nationwide Differential
Global Positioning System Program Fact Sheet, available at
http://www.tfhrc.gov/its/ndgps/02072.htm (last visited May 9, 2007).
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including for internal service evaluation and quality assurance purposes,
except as required by law.”234
[95] These privacy policies must be balanced against the [mis]information users obtain from television and film. Films and TV
programs, such as “CSI,” “24,” and “Enemy of the State” occasionally
show government agencies tracking users quite accurately via their cell
phones. Since the films are purely fictional and end users have at least
constructive notice of the cellular privacy notices, I believe users do have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell site data.
[96] Ultimately the government is correct that a cell phone user has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his location in a public place.
However, because a cellular phone user retains a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his cell site data, and because technology will soon improve to
the point where cell site data is likely to show a person’s location within a
home, this argument is immaterial: Obtaining prospective cell site data
without a warrant is, or at least soon will be, a violation of the 4th
Amendment.
D. SUMMARY
[97] The statutory scheme setup by the ECPA does not directly address the
acquisition of prospective cell site data. The Wiretap Act covers only
“contents” of communications and cell site data is not “contents.” The
Pen Register Provisions seem to cover prospective cell site data, but cell
site data is exempt from its coverage by CALEA. The SCA covers
historical cell site data but not prospective cell site data. The “hybrid
theory” – using the combined authority of the Pen Register Provisions and
the SCA – is flawed because neither statute provides the requisite
authority by itself for acquiring prospective cell site data and there is no
indication that Congress meant for these two statutes to be combined for
this purpose. Therefore, because the government seeks an order, the
default is a Rule 41 warrant. A Rule 41 warrant authorizes the acquisition
of prospective cell site data. A Rule 41 warrant can also be combined
234
Verizon Wireless Privacy Principles, available at http://www.verizonwireless.com
(follow “Privacy” hyperlink; then follow “Privacy Principles” hyperlink)(last visited May
9, 2007).
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with a pen register application and order to use the mechanism of the
physical pen register device to obtain the results authorized by the Rule 41
warrant.
[98] The Fourth Amendment does provide some limits on the acquisition
of prospective cell site data. Because cell site data is not actively given
over to the cellular provider through affirmative acts of the cellular phone
user, cell site data is not “voluntarily conveyed” to the cellular provider.
Thus a cellular phone user retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his cell site data. Any argument that the accuracy of existing technology
prevents the government from determining an individual’s location within
a residence is a short-term technology-specific argument which will
become moot in the near future as technology improves. Moreover,
cellular privacy policies enforce the users’ reasonable expectation of
privacy.
[99] In sum, where law enforcement seeks to obtain an order authorizing
the acquisition of prospective cell site data, it can do so only through a
showing, under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 41, of probable
cause to believe the prospective cell site data is evidence of a crime. Any
warrantless acquisition of prospective cell site data, whether through a
“hybrid theory” order or merely without any order, is unsupported by law
and likely to run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
[100] In this paper, I have examined law enforcement acquisition of
prospective cell site data by first describing the relevant cellular tracking
technology and related regulation, then examining the statutory schemes
and case law regarding electronic surveillance and cell site data prior to
2005, and finally analyzing the recent cases directly addressing the
government’s “hybrid theory” for obtaining prospective cell site data.
[101] I have concluded that under the current statutory scheme, the
government must obtain a Rule 41 warrant in order to acquire prospective
cell site data, whereas it need only obtain a SCA order to acquire historical
cell site data. In addition to the statutory limitations, the Fourth
Amendment is also likely to impose restrictions on how and when law
enforcement may acquire prospective cell site data.
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[102] The cell phone has become an important part of everyday life for
many Americans and has the potential to improve the lives of many
people. Innovation in cellular technology and cell phone usage may be
stifled, however, if government overreaching and ambiguities in electronic
surveillance law scare away end users. The confusing state of electronic
surveillance law relating to cell site data contributes to legal ambiguity
and leaves the system open to abuse. Moreover, abuse of the system could
lead to a form of the Panopticon that even Jeremy Bentham himself could
not have imagined. Congress should step in to regulate the acquisition of
prospective cell site data in order prevent abuse and encourage innovation
in and adoption of cellular technology.
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